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The double-facing Foreign Relations Function of the Executive  






How does the international Rule of Law apply to constrain the conduct of the Executive within a  
constitutional State that adopts a dualist approach to the reception of international law? This paper 
argues that, so far from being inconsistent with the concept of the Rule of Law, the Executive within 
a dualist constitution has a self-enforcing obligation to abide by the obligations of the State under 
international law. This is not dependent on Parliament’s incorporation of treaty obligations into 
domestic law. It is the correlative consequence of the allocation to the Executive of the power to 
conduct foreign relations. The paper develops this argument in response to recent debate in the 
United Kingdom on whether Ministers have an obligation to comply with international law–a 
reference that the Government removed from the Ministerial Code. It shows that such an obligation 
is consistent with both four centuries of the practice of the British State and with principle. 
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 It has been conventional wisdom that the United Kingdom ‘takes a fundamentally dualist 
view of international law. In other words, it sees domestic and international law as operating on 
different planes.’1 Yet recent events have shone a searchlight onto a neglected question that is 
central to an understanding of the operation of the ‘double-facing Constitution’ in a dualist state. 
The Constitution grants sovereign law-making power within the State to Parliament and at the 
same time allocates the conduct of foreign relations to the Executive. In that context: to what 
extent and, if so why, is the Executive bound to comply with international law obligations that it 
has contracted on behalf of the State, but which have not been directly incorporated into domestic 
law?  
 This question was exposed directly in the controversy sparked in 2015 by a revision to the 
Ministerial Code that omitted from its statement of Ministers’ duty to comply with the law the 
express reference that this includes ‘international law and treaty obligations.’ The amendment 
provoked public debate and litigation, eventually resulting in a decision of the Court of Appeal in 
2018.2 The impact of international law on the deliberative process of Government has also been 
exposed to view to an unprecedented extent in that long post-mortem into the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, the Chilcot Inquiry, which finally reported in 2016.3 It continues to be controversial. In 2018, 
Parliament insisted that the Attorney General produce his full legal advice to Ministers on the 
proposed arrangements regarding Northern Ireland in the draft Withdrawal Agreement for exiting 
the European Union. The advice was produced but only after Parliament had found Ministers in 
contempt for their failure to do so.4 
 The central argument advanced here is simply this: the Executive’s prerogative power 
under the Constitution to conduct the foreign relations of the State carries with it an obligation to 
do so in conformity with the international law obligations of the State, whether or not such 
obligations are also directly incorporated into domestic law by statute. Such an obligation is a 
direct consequence of the application of the doctrine of the separation of powers to the foreign 
affairs power. It does not conflict with the sovereignty of Parliament to make law domestically.  
 Nor does it necessarily mean that executive decisions may be subjected to judicial scrutiny 
before domestic courts for their compliance with international law. Much of the scholarly and the 
public debate about unincorporated international law obligations has tended to conflate the 
nature of the duty with the extent to which it is justiciable. The latter question implicates a whole 
different set of considerations, precisely because it engages the role of the judiciary as a separate 
organ of government in the review of executive decision.  
 Rather, the distinctive point about the obligation upon the Executive to comply with the 
international law obligations of the state is that it is, to a large degree, self-enforcing. This does 
not mean that it lacks substance or real legal force. On the contrary, as with many of the most 
                                                        
1 Lord Mance, ‘International law in the UK Supreme Court’ (King’s College London, 13 February 2017) available 
at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170213.pdf (last accessed 21 January 2019). 
2 R (Gulf Centre for Human Rights) v Prime Minister [2018] EWCA Civ 1855. 
3 United Kingdom House of Commons ‘Report of the Iraq Inquiry’ (HC 264, 6 July 2016). 
4 Hansard, HC, vol 650, col 728 (4 December 2018, div 273); A-G’s letter dated 13 November 2018 available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/761852.
pdf (last accessed 11 December 2018). 
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fundamental aspects of a living constitution, it is the internal recognition of the duty by the 
constitutional actors that matters most. In a largely unwritten constitution, however, such 
compliance depends upon a continuity of shared understanding as to the operation of the system 
and the principles that underpin it.  
 The debate provoked by this amendment is important because it exposed some 
fundamental misunderstandings about the import of the obligation upon Ministers to abide by 
international law and its application in a dualist state. It is incorrect to state, as some have 
claimed, that ‘Ministers have never been legally bound to obey unincorporated treaty obligations’ 
or that ‘if any such legal duty were to become part of our law it would have momentous 
constitutional consequences, undercutting the supremacy of Parliament over the executive and, 
contrary to the principle of the rule of law itself, confronting Ministers with inconsistent legal 
obligations.’5 
 These propositions are neither descriptively nor normatively correct. The duty on Ministers 
to abide by international law is not a recent aberration in constitutional practice. In fact, as this 
paper will seek to show, this is an obligation that, together with the concomitant duty of the Law 
Officers of the Crown to advise Ministers on international law, has at least four centuries of state 
practice behind it. It is fully coherent with the allocation of functions within the constitution and 
with the primacy of Parliamentary sovereignty, which the concept of dualism seeks to protect. 
Indeed the dualist approach is justifiable precisely because the Executive’s foreign affairs function 
within such a constitution carries with it the obligation to abide by the international law 
obligations that the Executive contracts on behalf of the State. 
 In any event, by framing the issue as one concerning unincorporated treaty obligations, 
those that would seek to negate a Ministerial obligation to comply with international law on 
grounds of dualism, omit to consider that in relation to customary international law, the United 
Kingdom is not, and never has been, a dualist State. On the contrary, the general law of nations is 
part of the law of England. This, too, is a necessary consequence of the separation of powers within 
the constitutional compact, and not in derogation from it. It carries real consequences for the 
conduct of the Executive, particularly in those cases in which high foreign policy is engaged. 
 In order to make these points good it will be necessary to examine, as a matter of practice, 
the constitutional significance of the role of the Legal Advisers to the Crown when they advise 
Ministers on international law (Part 3). It will then be possible in Part 4 to evaluate, as a matter of 
principle, how this fits within a constitutional theory of the separation of powers and a dualist 
constitution. At the outset, however, Part 2 outlines the dispute over the amendment to the 
Ministerial Code in order to see what is at stake. 
                                                        
5 Richard Ekins and Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘The Ministerial Code and the Rule of Law’ UK Constitutional Law 
Blog (6 November 2015), available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ (last accessed 11 December 2018). 
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2. International law in the Ministerial Code 
a) Development of the Code 
 The Ministerial Code began its life as an informal and confidential document that was 
issued as guidance by the Prime Minister to Cabinet at the outset of each new Government as 
Questions of Procedure for Ministers. While it was still possible for the Nolan Committee to describe 
the code in 1995 as having ‘no particular constitutional status,’6 the prominence accorded to the 
code in both the Nolan and the Scott Inquiry7 and its successive reissue has confirmed its status as 
‘the defining constitutional document on Prime Minister and Cabinet.’8  
 By the 1990’s the code had come to include a reference to Ministers’ obligation to comply 
with the law, including international law.9 The Ministerial Code issued by Tony Blair in 1997 
provided in the notes to paragraph 1 that: 
The notes should be read against the background of the duty of Ministers to comply with the 
law, including international law and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of 
justice…10 
The now retitled Ministerial Code is also referred to in The Cabinet Manual (2011) as the principal 
source of ‘the principles underpinning the standards of conduct expected of ministers.’11 
The 2010 edition of the Code provided in paragraph 1.2: 
The Ministerial Code should be read alongside the Coalition Agreement and the background 
of the overarching duty on Ministers to comply with the law including international law and 
treaty obligations and to uphold the administration of justice and to protect the integrity of 
public life.12 
The 2011 Cabinet Manual is to like effect.13 
Lord Bingham, writing extra-judicially in his book The Rule of Law, described this overarching duty 
in the Ministerial Code as ‘binding on British ministers.’14 
                                                        
6 Lord Nolan, ‘Standards in public life: first report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life’ Cm 2850 (May 
1995), vol 1, [9]. 
7 Richard Scott, ‘Return to an address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 15th February 1996 for 
the report of the inquiry into the export of defence equipment and dual-use goods to Iraq and related 
prosecutions’ HC 115 (15 February 1996). 
8 Peter Madgwick and Diana Woodhouse, The Law and Politics of the Constitution (Hertfordshire: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1995). 
9 United Kingdom, House of Commons Library ‘Questions of Procedure for Ministers’ (Research Paper 96/53, 19 
April 1996), 8. See also Frank Berman, ‘International law and the Ministerial Code’ The Guardian (25 October 
2015). 
10 A Baker, Prime Ministers and the Rule Book (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2000), 152. 
11 United Kingdom, The Cabinet Manual (1st edn, 2011), [3.46]. 
12 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code: A Code of Ethics and Procedural Guidance for Ministers (July 
2005), [1.2], emphasis added. 
13 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (1st edition, 2011), [3.46]. 
14 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin Press, 2011), Chapter 10. 
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b) The amendment 
 In 2015, the Government amended this paragraph to omit the reference to international 
law. The revised text stated: 
The Ministerial Code should be read against the background of the overarching duty on 
Ministers to comply with the law and to protect the integrity of public life.15 
 When this amendment was published, it provoked a sharp response, including from former 
senior lawyers in the Civil Service. Sir Franklin Berman QC (Legal Adviser to the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office 1991-9) wrote:16 
It is impossible not to feel a sense of disbelief at what must have been the deliberate 
suppression of the reference to the international law in the new version of the ministerial 
code. ... 
I claim part of the credit for the previous formula, dating from my time as legal adviser to 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the 1990s. The clear intention was at the time was 
to avoid any reverse inferences from the earlier mention simply of “the law of the land” and 
to ensure that the duty to obey the law was the same for civil servants and for ministers. 
 Sir Paul Jenkins (Treasury Solicitor and Head of the Government Legal Service 2006-14) 
added:17 
It is disingenuous of the Cabinet Office to dismiss the changes to the ministerial code as 
mere tidying up. As the government’s most senior legal official I saw at close hand from 2010 
onwards the intense irritation these words caused the PM as he sought to avoid complying 
with our international legal obligations, for example in relation to prisoner voting. Whether 
the new wording alters the legal obligations of ministers or not, there can be no doubt that 
they will regard the change as bolstering, in a most satisfying way, their contempt for the 
rule of international law. 
 Questions were asked in Parliament about the amendment. In the House of Lords, the 
responsible Minister, Lord Faulks, was asked whether he would give the House a categorical 
assurance ‘that the amendment to the Ministerial Code will make absolutely no difference to 
Ministers’ existing duty to comply with international law and treaty obligations.’18 He said: 
My Lords, as the noble Lord will be aware, we have a dualist system rather than a monist 
system. Neither Parliament nor the courts are bound by international law, but a member of 
the Executive, including a Minister such as myself, is obliged to follow international law, 
whether it is reflected in the Ministerial Code or not. All Ministers will be aware of their 
obligations under the rule of law. 
                                                        
15 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (2010), [1.3]. This formulation is unchanged in the January 
2018 edition. 
16 Frank Berman, ‘International law and the Ministerial Code’ The Guardian (25 October 2015). 
17 P Jenkins, The Guardian (25 October 2015). 
18 Hansard, HL, vol 765 cols 1170-1 (28 October 2015). 
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He added later that week:19 
Our position is that all Ministers are obliged to abide by the law, including, in so far as it is 
ascertainable, international law in this country.  
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood asked: 
Am I right in supposing that this amendment is really a prelude to the introduction of a 
British Bill of Rights in place of the existing Human Rights Act, and is intended principally to 
clarify the fact that our own domestic primary legislation trumps unincorporated treaty law? 
The Minister replied: 
The noble and learned Lord is quite right. He points to the difference between the dualist 
system, which we have, and the monist system whereby unless law is incorporated in an Act 
of Parliament, it does not become automatically a part of the law. The question of the 
amendments to the Bill of Rights, when or if it comes before Parliament, is somewhat 
separate but he accurately states the necessary constitutional principles. 
On being pressed to answer why exactly did the Government change the wording, the Minister said: 
I fear that I will be repeating myself but they have changed the wording because it is a 
simple summary of what is plainly the position, which is that Ministers have an obligation to 
obey the law. The code does not change the obligation that comes from the law; it is simply 
a summary for Ministers. 
The Cabinet Office also confirmed: ‘ “Comply with the law” includes international law.’20 
 Yet the proposition that a change was intended was not without foundation. An important 
element in the Conservative Party manifesto in 2014 had been to reassert the primacy of the UK 
Supreme Court and Parliament by introducing a new British Bill of Rights and at the same time to 
curb what was seen as the excessive role of the European Court of Human Rights.21 The manifesto 
added, for good measure:22 
We will amend the Ministerial Code to remove any ambiguity in the current rules about the 
duty of Ministers to follow the will of Parliament in the UK. 
c) The judicial review proceedings 
 In a bid to clarify whether the Government did indeed intend a change in the legal position, 
the Gulf Centre for Human Rights launched judicial review proceedings seeking an explanation as 
to why the change had been made.23 
                                                        
19 Hansard, HL, vol 765 cols 1523-4 (3 November 2015). 
20 The Guardian (22 October 2015), cited in HC Library Briefing Paper ‘The Ministerial Code and the Independent 
Adviser on Ministerial Interests’ (No 03750, 17 January 2018), [2.2], 11-12. 
21 UK Conservative Party, ‘Protecting human rights in the UK: the Conservatives’ proposals for changing 
Britain’s human rights laws.’ 
22 Ibid, 7. Emphasis in original. 
23 R (ex p Gulf Centre for Human Rights) v Prime Minister [2016] EWHC 1323 (Admin). 
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 At first instance, Mitting J rejected the application for judicial review on the grounds that 
the challenged wording is not part of the operative Ministerial Code. ‘It is’, thought the learned 
judge, ‘simply a statement of the background against which those obligations should be read.’24 
Since ‘[t]he challenge to the decision could only be based on its lawfulness. The fact that it might 
be in breach of an unincorporated provision of international law and that the minister was said to 
be under a duty to comply with international law would not avail the claimant.’25 
 The claimant appealed against Mitting J’s refusal to grant permission for judicial review.26 
Arden LJ granted conditional leave only on the question whether there was a change of substance 
in the two versions of the Code.27 The Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and Hamblen J 
heard the appeal. The Court held that no change of substance was made. The overarching duty 
referred to in the Code was not imposed by it. Rather the Code referenced existing duties outside 
the Code. The Court held that:28 
[T]he reference to ‘international law and treaty obligations’ in the 2010 Code is subsumed 
within the stated duty ‘to comply with the law.’ That duty includes those obligations. 
Whatever the precise meaning of the reference to those obligations, they are not 
independent obligations but simply part of the ‘overarching’ duty of compliance with the 
law. 
The Government had confirmed this to Parliament in 2015 and again to the Court.29 In light of these 
conclusions, the appeal was dismissed. 
d) The arguments advanced in support of the amendment 
 Was this, then, nothing more than a peculiarly British storm in a teacup? One might gain 
that impression from reading the judgments. But the debate in Court was framed, as it had to be, in 
terms of the scope of judicial review. The outcome of those proceedings (and the earlier Ministerial 
statements to Parliament) may have usefully confirmed that no change in Ministers’ obligations 
was intended. But the decision of the Court of Appeal neatly side stepped the more fundamental 
question of exactly what those obligations are, when they arise by virtue of treaties that have not 
been incorporated into domestic law. The statement that Ministers must obey ‘the law,’ while 
compendious, does little to illuminate the source and nature of the obligation to obey 
international law. 
 It is at this point that the obligation as originally formulated faced three more fundamental 
challenges: the first alleging that the concept of the Rule of Law itself is really a concept that is 
only applicable to the internal operation of the domestic legal system of a State; the second based 
on alleged incompatibility with the two bedrock principles of the Constitution: Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the Rule of Law; and the third derived from the separation between the 
international and the domestic legal spheres. In each case, these arguments proceed from the 
                                                        
24 Ibid, [8]. 
25 Ibid, [9]. 
26 R (ex p Gulf Centre for Human Rights) v Prime Minister [2018] EWCA Civ 1855. 
27 Ibid, [13]. 
28 Ibid, [20]. 
29 Ibid, [19]-[24]. 
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same point of departure: that Ministers may be placed in a position of conflicting obligations 
arising respectively from domestic and international law, which has to be resolved in favour of one 
source of law or the other.30 It is necessary to examine precisely the way in which each of these 
arguments was advanced before considering their tenability.  
 The first proposition is that we cannot understand the concept of the Rule of Law as 
applying to international law, which is ‘like it or not, a defective example of law,’ such that ‘[i]f we 
can speak of the Rule of Law in the international domain…it is only a Rule by imperfect analogy 
with the law of the land.’31 Rather, it is claimed that the concept of the Rule of Law is ‘intimately 
connected to the institution of the state’ 32  Its application to the international sphere is 
questionable, and would require substantial qualification. 
 The second proposition is that: ‘When international law conflicts with domestic law, the 
constitutional principle of the rule of law requires British courts and ministers––and other legal 
subjects––to follow British law.’33 Finnis goes further and claims that the idea of a legal obligation 
upon Ministers to abide by international law challenges ‘that most fundamental principle of our 
constitutional law, and thus also challenges the Rule of Law.’34 He argues that, if Ministers were 
under a legal obligation to abide by international law, the consequence would be that Ministers 
would be entitled to ‘change the legal rights or obligations of anyone in the realm simply by 
entering into or ratifying an international treaty’ and, further, that they could ‘change the legal 
rights or duties of present or future Ministers.’35 In his view, the result is that the obligation on 
Ministers to abide by international law, and to account to their colleagues and to Parliament for 
the international obligations that they contract is merely an expression of a ‘morally grounded UK 
policy.’ This may be ‘an important principle of responsible government of our constitutional form’ 
but ‘none of this imposes on Ministers (or civil servants) anything comparable to their personal 
obligation as citizens and Ministers to comply with the law, that is, with the law of the land.’36 
 The third proposition is that any difficulty that may be posed by any apparent conflict 
between the UK’s international obligations and domestic law is resolved by the fact that ‘ultimately 
these two elements of legal doctrine inhabit different––domestic and international––legal 
dimensions.’37 From this separation of realms, critics of the prior formulation derive a separation of 
the persons subject to legal obligation. Only the State, the United Kingdom, is responsible as a 
matter of international law, not Ministers personally. In turn Ministers’ obligations arise only under 
domestic law. As a result: ‘Under our constitution, Ministers are incapable of imposing legal 
obligations on themselves or on their successors by way of the Crown’s prerogative to conduct 
foreign relations.’38 
                                                        
30 Mark Elliot, ‘The Ministerial Code and international law’ (26 October 2015) available at: 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/ (last accessed 10 February 2019). 
31 John Finnis, ‘Ministers, international law, and the rule of law’ Judicial Power Project (2 November 2015) 
available at: www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk (last accessed 10 February 2019). 
32 Ekins and Verdirame, ‘The Ministerial Code and the Rule of Law’. 
33 Ibid. 
34 John Finnis, ‘Ministers, international law, and the rule of law’. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
37 Mark Elliot, ‘The Ministerial Code and international law’. 
38 Ekins and Verdirame, ‘The Ministerial Code and the Rule of Law’. 
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 These arguments all proceed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and 
source of the legal obligation upon Ministers to abide by the international law commitments of the 
State. The obligation on Ministers is a principle of the British Constitution, not of international law. 
It is an essential correlative of the exercise by Ministers of the Royal prerogative to conduct foreign 
relations––itself a legal power conferred upon Ministers by the Constitution. These points of 
principle will be developed in Part IV. The arguments are not only falsifiable as a matter of 
principle. They are also contrary to the established constitutional practice of the United Kingdom 
over (at least) four centuries. Recent events demonstrate that this practice has lost none of its 
force. In view of the density of this practice, it will be possible only to sketch it in outline, which is 
the task that Part III will address. 
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3. British state practice 
 This Part advances five points derived from the practice of the British State that are of 
more general application to the theme of the present essay. It considers: (a) the constitutional role 
of the Law Officers of the Crown in advising on international law; (b) the assumption underlying the 
seeking of advice as to the determinacy of international law; (c) the significance of international 
legality to the conduct of British foreign policy; (d) even in the exceptional cases where 
international law was not followed or much disputed; and (e) the accountability of the Executive to 
Parliament for the consistency of its foreign policy with international law. 
a) Advice of the Law Officers of the Crown on international law 
 The Governmental legal adviser on matters of international law has a critically important 
function in the development of the foreign policy of the State. As Berman puts it:39 
[T]he main role of the Governmental legal adviser is to ‘make’ his Government comply with 
international law….It is a truism to say that the question whether or not to comply with what 
international law requires is always a question of policy. But even the meanest definition of 
the role of the international legal adviser in government cannot treat that policy question as 
if it were an entirely neutral one. It must be assumed to be a necessary part of the role that 
the international legal adviser should be expected to use his gifts of exposition and 
persuasion to bring those with whom the power of decision lies to use this power to the 
right result. 
 Within the British State, this function has over centuries taken on a particular 
constitutional significance. At least since the Sixteenth Century, Law Officers of the Crown have 
advised the British Government as to its obligations and those of other states with whom it is 
engaged under international law.40 This practice originated in the taking of advice from the civilians 
of Doctors’ Commons.41 The evidence from the State Papers establishes that even ‘before the 
period when international law was greatly developed, the English Government was convinced of 
the necessity of juridical study and advice upon international questions.’42 From about 1600 until 
1872, the Crown’s standing adviser on questions of international law was the King’s Advocate-
General. He was appointed by letters patent and was consulted constantly. This practice continued 
after the establishment of the Foreign Office as a separate Department of State in 1782.43  
                                                        
39 Frank Berman, ‘The role of the international lawyer in the making of foreign policy’ in Chanaka 
Wickremasinghe (ed.), The International Lawyer as Practitioner (London British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2000) 3. Berman served as Principal Legal Adviser to the UK FCO, 1991-1999. 
40 Arnold McNair, ‘The debt of international law in Britain to the Civil Law and the civilians’ (1953) 39 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 183, reprinted in Arnold McNair, International Law Opinions, Selected and 
Annotated, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956) vol. III, App. II; Clive Parry (1965) VII BDIL 242-
281; Clive Parry, Law Officers' opinions to the Foreign Office 1793-1860: A reproduction of the manuscript series 
with index and commentaries 97 vols. (Westmead, UK: Gregg International Publishers, 1970-1973); Clive Parry, 
Great Britain Law Officers’ Opinions (6 micro-film reels, Trans-Media, 1976). 
41 Ibid. 
42 William Holdsworth, History of English Law vol. 5 (Methuen, 1924), 44. 
43 McNair, International Law Opinions, vol. III, 424-5. The demise of this office may perhaps be partly 
attributable to the débâcle over delay in advice by the Queen’s Advocate on the Alabama, the vessel, whose 
provision to Confederate forces in the course of the American Civil War gave rise to the Alabama arbitration. A 
full account is given in Parry (1965) VII BDIL 274-281; See: Frank Berman and Michael Wood, Submission in 
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 After 1876, the Foreign Office acquired its own legal adviser, who could provide a ‘reservoir 
of specialist expertise’44 and continuous advice on all matters of international law that arise in the 
daily work of the Office. But this did not lead to the Law Officers abandoning their function of 
advising the Crown on matters of international law that are engaged in the high level policy 
decisions of the Government. Following the retirement of the last Advocate-General in 1872, this 
function passed to the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General as the principal law officers of the 
Crown.45 Both of these positions are held by members of the Ministry who also sit in Parliament. As 
such they are called upon to advise Cabinet on issues of both domestic law and international law 
that may arise.46 As a consequence, they assume Ministerial responsibility for their advice. 
 Parry, discussing the binding force of Law Officers’ Opinions in the British Digest of 
International Law, published in 1965, notes that, while ‘there is not, it would seem, any absolute 
constitutional duty’47 on the Government to follow the Law Officers’ advice, the ‘Government has 
consistently considered itself in practice precluded from ordering “policy” otherwise than as the 
“law”, or rather the exposition of it the Law Officers have given, dictates.’48 He concludes on that ‘at 
least during the period covered by this volume, a Law Officers’ report, if capable of translation into 
action, was so translated invariably, unquestioningly and automatically.’49 
 Berman and Wood encapsulate the constitutional significance of seeking the advice of the 
Law Officers of the Crown in the following way:50 
When high-level policy decisions, including at Cabinet level, involve questions of 
international law, not only will the Attorney General’s advice as the normal rule be available 
in advance, but the Attorney will usually be present in person to explain that advice 
Minister-to-Minister, and subsequently to provide any further advice that may be needed 
arising out of the discussion. 
These arrangements have proved to be very effective in melding together a substantial body 
of specialised expertise in international law with the extra weight of the Attorney General’s 
broader experience, and his or her standing as a Member of the Government. Taken together, 
they ensure that the importance of complying with international law is fully taken into 
account, not least under circumstances of intense political pressure. 
b) Determinacy of international law 
 The second point is that, whatever the difficulty of the question posed, the practice of the 
Crown in taking legal advice presupposes that questions of critical importance in the conduct of 
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foreign relations are capable of a legal answer according to the rules of international law. Such an 
answer is arrived at after full consideration and evaluation by way of a reasoned legal opinion of 
the legal arguments. This has been the way in which international law has been regarded in the 
United Kingdom, even in a much earlier period when the rules of international law were not at all 
developed to the same extent as they are today. 
 So, for example, the Report of the Law Officers of 18 January 1753 on the Silesian Loan,51 
which dealt with a controversy between Great Britain and the King of Prussia, dealt amongst other 
things with the legality of reprisals for the capture of vessels as prize at sea during times of war. 
The Law Officers answered:52 
The Law of Nations, founded upon Justice, Equity, Convenience and the Reason of the Thing, 
and confirmed by long Usage, don’t allow of Reprizals, except in Case of violent Injuries, 
directed or supported by the State, and Justice, absolutely denied, in Re minime dubiâ, by all 
the Tribunals, and afterwards by the Prince. 
 When the King of the Two Sicilies refused to observe the Treaty of Commerce of 1667 
between Britain and Naples, Lord Halifax sought the advice of Marriott, the King’s Advocate. 
Marriott memorably replied on 30 November 1764 in terms of enduring contemporary relevance:53 
[A]ll Treaties whatsoever whether of Pacification, Alliance or of Commerce concluded 
between Sovereigns of respective States are not Personal but National and therefore like all 
other national Rights and Obligations, inseparable from each other, are valid in 
Succession….[If] all Treaties between Sovereign and Sovereign are merely personal then it 
follows that Treaties of Pacification would be nothing in Effect but Truces…they would be 
dependent upon Lives and upon National Revolutions…The Sovereign contracts not for 
himself as a private Person (for that Idea would be injurious to Sovereignty) but as a public 
One. In other words, he binds himself, his Successors and his People, as the great 
Representative of a whole Kingdom, who neither dies nor changes in his national Capacity. 
c) Constitutional significance of international legality 
 The third point is that the international legality of the actions of the State produces 
consequences for the Government domestically as well as internationally. As Bethlehem put it:54 
Legality is paramount; not for reasons of lip service, and not simply for the reason that we 
are a democratic state whose conduct is based on law, but also because such issues engage 
wider governmental considerations…for both governments and individuals. Governments 
may stand or fall by reference to considerations of legality. 
 The acute importance of international law to the conduct of a Ministry is vividly illustrated 
by the research of Isabel Hull into the deliberations of the British War Cabinet in World War I.55 Hull 
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demonstrates the importance of Belgian neutrality, as lynch-pin of the system of European order 
bounded by international law so painstakingly constructed in the pre-War era, as the basis for 
Britain entering the War.56 But the importance of the Great War for present purposes is what it 
demonstrates about the constraints of international law upon the British Government’s own 
conduct of the war. The British blockade of shipping was constructed with painstaking 
consideration of the position under international law and ‘[t]he cabinet returned to the legal 
dilemmas again and again.’57  
 The resulting Order in Council was tested upon the requisition of a Swedish neutral ship 
carrying a cargo of copper in Prize Court in The Zamora.58 The case was appealed to the Privy 
Council and argued for the Crown by the Attorney General and Solicitor General.59 Lord Parker of 
Waddington delivered the judgment of the Board. His Lordship begins with a classic exposition of 
the separation of powers, in holding that: ‘The idea that the King in Council, or indeed any branch 
of the Executive, has power to prescribe or alter the law to be administered by the Courts of this 
country is out of harmony with the principles of our Constitution.’60 But the Prize Court does not 
administer domestic law. It administers international law. The Board rejected the suggestion that 
this affects the ability of the Executive to prescribe the law applicable in such a court. The Prize 
Court ‘must ascertain and give effect to a law which is not laid down by any particular State, but 
originates in the practice and usage long observed by civilized nations in their relations towards 
each other or in express international agreement.’61 This rule is of particular importance in prize 
cases, so that a neutral aggrieved by the actions of a belligerent power can be assured that he has 
a right of recourse to a court which administers international law. The rule requiring exhaustion of 
local remedies would otherwise ‘entirely vanish if a Court of Prize, while nominally administering a 
law of international obligation, were in reality acting under the direction of the Executive of a 
belligerent Power.’62 A Committee assembled by the Attorney General after this decision concluded 
that ‘The Government cannot by executive act alter international law in its favour.’63 
 Even in time of war when matters of vital national survival were at stake, the British 
Government recognised that international law operated as a constraint upon its actions for which it 
could be held to account domestically as well as internationally.  
d) Exceptional cases 
 The significance within the national constitution of the principle that the Executive is 
constrained in its exercise of its foreign affairs power by international law, on which it receives 
advice from the Law Officers of the Crown is underscored by the constitutional significance of two 
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much discussed incidents involving the use of force abroad: the Suez Intervention in 1956 and the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
 In the first case, the Executive deliberately decided not to seek a formal opinion from the 
Law Officers, knowing (as the evidence now establishes) that it would not be favourable to the 
adventure. As the research of Geoffrey Marston from the Foreign Office archives vividly 
demonstrates, 64  the Government proceeded on the basis of advice proffered by the Lord 
Chancellor,65 which was emphatically rejected by the Law Officers of the Crown. On the eve of the 
ill-fated Suez intervention, the Attorney General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller (later Viscount 
Dilhorne) wrote to the Foreign Secretary (copied to the Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor):66 
It is just not true to say that we are entitled under the Charter to take any measures open to 
us ‘to stop the fighting.’ Nor would it be true to say that under international law apart from 
the Charter we are entitled to do so. Further, it is not true to say that under international law 
we are entitled to take any measures open to us ‘to protect our interests which are 
threatened by hostilities. …. 
I feel compelled to write this letter because as the Law Officers are constitutionally the legal 
advisers of the Government…it will be generally assumed that we have been approached for 
advice as to the legality of what has been done. In fact we were not consulted on this matter 
nor were we upon questions relating to the Suez Canal before Israel’s attack. 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, wrote a memorandum to his colleagues 
in the Foreign Office to the same effect.67 
 The decision of the British Government to support an armed intervention in Iraq in 2003 
also demonstrates the consequences where the constitutional process is not properly followed. As 
a result of the exhaustive investigation of the Chilcot Inquiry, the process of seeking legal advice in 
this case has been exposed to public scrutiny.68 Some elements of this narrative deserve special 
emphasis for their relevance here.  
 Following the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, the 
Government decided to delay calling for formal legal advice from the Attorney General, Lord 
Goldsmith.69 Lord Goldsmith provided draft advice to the Prime Minister, Mr Blair, on 14 January 
2002, which was not shared with Cabinet or the Foreign Secretary, Mr Straw. Lord Goldsmith stated 
that a further decision by the Security Council would be needed to revive the authorisation to use 
force contained in Resolution 678 (1990) and that he saw no grounds for self-defence or 
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humanitarian intervention providing the legal basis for military action in Iraq.70 Despite this advice, 
Mr Blair continued to say in public that he would not rule out military action if a further resolution 
in response to an Iraqi breach was vetoed. These statements were at odds with Lord Goldsmith’s 
advice.71 The Inquiry concluded that: ‘Mr Blair’s response suggested a readiness to seek any ground 
on which Lord Goldsmith would be able to conclude that there was a legal basis for military 
action.’72 
 The Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, Michael Wood, had given legal advice to the same 
effect to the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw on 22-23 January 2003. Mr Straw wrote to Mr Wood on 29 
January 2003 stating: ‘I note your advice, but I do not accept it.’73 Lord Goldsmith wrote to advise Mr 
Straw that the proper constitutional course where a Minister challenges legal advice he has 
received is to seek an opinion from the Law Officers.74  
 On 27 February 2003, after a visit to Washington on 10 February, Lord Goldsmith met 
officials at Downing Street and advised that ‘I am prepared to accept–and I am choosing my words 
carefully here–that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable of reviving the 
authorisation in 678 without a further resolution if there are strong factual grounds for concluding 
that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity.’75 He confirmed this advice formally on 7 March 
2003.76 By 13 March 2003, the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and the Civil Service pressed him 
to state his opinion on the legality of the proposed intervention more definitively. Admiral Boyce 
considered this to be essential because the members of the armed forces, who might otherwise 
incur personal liability under international criminal law if they were deployed, were entitled to 
receive an unequivocal assurance as to the legality of the use of force.77 
  In response, Lord Goldsmith confirmed that he was ‘satisfied that the proposed military 
action by the UK would be in accordance with national and international law.’78 Thereafter Lord 
Goldsmith provided a written answer to Parliament on the legality of the intervention on 17 March 
2003, in which he confirmed: ‘It is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply and therefore Iraq was at 
the time of resolution 1441 and continues to be in material breach. Thus the authority to use force 
under resolution 678 has revived and so continues today.’79 A Cabinet meeting on the same day 
endorsed the use of force in Iraq. Cabinet was provided with a copy of that Statement, which set 
out the Government’s legal position. It was not provided with the legal basis for the conclusion that 
Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under 
resolution 1441, nor with a legal opinion that set out the competing arguments.80 The Inquiry 
concluded that ‘Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice which fully 
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reflected the position on 17 March, explained the legal basis on which the UK could take military 
action and set out the risks of legal challenge.’81  
 On 18 March 2003, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, FCO Deputy Legal Adviser, resigned stating:82 
I regret that I cannot agree that it is lawful to use force against Iraq without a second 
Security Council resolution to revive the authorisation given in SCR 678…. My views accord 
with the advice that has been given consistently in this Office before and after the adoption 
of SCR 1441 and with what the Attorney General gave us to understand was his view prior to 
his letter of 7 March. (The view expressed in that letter has of course changed again into 
what is now the official line.) I cannot in conscience go along with advice––within the Office 
or to the public or Parliament––which asserts the legitimacy of military action without such a 
resolution, particularly since an unlawful use of force on such a scale amounts to the crime 
of aggression; nor can I agree with such action in circumstances which are so detrimental to 
the international order and the rule of law. 
 What are we to make of this débâcle for present purposes? This was, after all, a case in 
which the Attorney’s advice was sought and given. Yet the circumstances were such as to give rise 
to a major concern that that process had been misused by a Government merely intent on finding a 
legal justification in international law for an action that it was determined to take. Three 
observations of a rather general character need to be made.  
 In the first place, the question of international legality was central to the concerns of all 
the constitutional actors, not just the legal advisers. Secondly, those actors knew the paramount 
importance of an affirmative opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown. That is precisely why 
Ministers delayed seeking such an opinion to the eleventh hour. Thirdly, the officers of State that 
would be responsible for implementation of the Government’s decision, namely the members of 
the armed forces, insisted upon definitive advice on legality under international law as a 
precondition to action. For them legality under international law is paramount because it is the 
source of their permission to use lethal force.83 There was a widespread view both at the time and 
thereafter that the legal basis cited by the Government for the invasion was unsound and that the 
Attorney had changed his opinion under intense political pressure to suit the Government policy. 
Those concerns resulted in reviews of both the role of the Attorney General in general and the 
conduct of the decision-making in relation to Iraq.84 These reviews have served to underscore, and 
not to undermine, the importance of the requirement upon the Executive to undertake foreign 
policy action in accordance with Britain’s international law obligations in accordance with 
dispassionate advice from the Law Officers of the Crown. 
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e) Accountability to Parliament 
 A final aspect of the constitutional role of the Law Officers of the Crown vis-à-vis 
international law is the extent of their accountability to Parliament for their advice. A review of the 
position in 1984 noted the inconsistency of Government practice with regard to the disclosure to 
Parliament of the Attorney’s advice to on international law matters.85 Sir Harold Wilson maintained 
in 1963 that: 86 
The Attorney General, whoever he may be, is not only the legal adviser to the Crown and to 
the Government. He is also a servant of this House. It is, from time to time, his duty to advise 
the House on legal matters––a duty going beyond his responsibility to the Government and 
the Crown….  
Closer examination of instances involving issues of the compatibility of proposed legislation with 
the international obligations of the United Kingdom shows some instances where the Attorney’s 
legal advice was disclosed to Parliament 87 and some other instances where disclosure was 
resisted.88 Sir Michael Havers AG contended that there was no such duty. He thought this ‘would 
raise conflicts with the primary duty of the Law Officers to advise the Crown on legal questions.’89  
 Erskine May states the principle in terms of a constitutional convention:90 
By long-standing convention, observed by successive Governments, the fact of, and 
substance of advice from, the law officers of the Crown is not disclosed outside government. 
This convention is referred to in paragraph 2.13 of the Ministerial Code. The purpose of this 
convention is to enable the government to obtain frank and full legal advice in confidence. 
Therefore, the opinions of the law officers of the Crown, being confidential, are not usually 
laid before Parliament, cited in debate or provided in evidence before a select committee, 
and their production has frequently been refused; but if a Minister deems it expedient that 
such opinions should be made known for the information of the House, the Speaker has 
ruled that the orders of the House are in no way involved in the proceeding. 
 Berman and Wood express the balance between accountability to Parliament and the need 
to maintain confidentiality of legal advice in the following way:91 
[T]he current arrangements also ensure that there is direct Parliamentary accountability in 
respect of the legal positions which the Government adopts in this vital area. The 
accountability is of course of a special kind, not identical with that which applies to policy 
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decisions. It has to reflect, amongst other things, the confidentiality that necessarily 
attaches to advice given by a lawyer to the client, a factor that may be particularly acute 
when the issue under consideration is a matter of dispute internationally, or may become 
the subject of judicial proceedings nationally or internationally. All the same, the fact that 
the Attorney General is a Minister and sits in Parliament at least enables a direct and 
authoritative explanation to be given of the Government’s legal views, allows for 
Parliamentary Questions to be posed and answered, and may in appropriate cases also allow 
for such issues to be knowledgeably debated. 
 The extent to which Parliament may compel the Attorney to disclose to it his advice to the 
Government on the legal effect at international law of steps that the Government proposes to take 
has gained prominence in recent years. As has been seen, at the time of the proposed entry into 
armed conflict in Iraq, the Attorney gave a written statement to the House of Lords on the legal 
position but did not disclose his written legal advice to the Government. A motion that he should 
be compelled to do so was defeated in the Commons in 2004,92 but the Government subsequently 
decided, in the face of continuing public controversy, to disclose it voluntarily. In 2015, the point 
arose again in the context of the Government’s plan to extend its air strikes against ISIS into Syria. 
The Prime Minister gave a statement to the House on the legal position, but both he and the 
Attorney reiterated the convention against disclosure of the written advice.93 
 The matter came to a head very recently, when Parliament sought clarification of the legal 
effect of the proposed provisions on Ireland and Northern Ireland in the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement with the European Union. The Attorney disclosed his legal advice94 only after an 
unprecedented contempt motion against the Government was passed in the House of Commons.95 
 The point here is that under the British Constitution the Ministry is accountable to 
Parliament not merely, as Dicey emphasised, for its general conduct of the foreign affairs 
prerogative.96 It is also accountable to Parliament for the legality of its exercise of that power 
under international law. The Law Officers of the Crown are members of Parliament and can be 
called upon to explain the Government’s legal position on its obligations under international law 
where Parliament so requires. In exceptional cases, they can also be required to produce to 
Parliament their written legal advice.  
 In this light, it is now possible in Part IV to return to the arguments of principle raised 
against the proposition that Ministers are under an obligation to comply with international law and 
to consider how those arguments are to be answered. 
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4. The obligation in constitutional principle 
 The previous Part has sought to demonstrate that the practice of the British State over 
several centuries supports the proposition that the Executive has a constitutional duty to comply 
with the international law obligations of the State. The present Part considers the nature of that 
obligation in light of the principles that underlie the constitutional compact in its application to 
the field of foreign relations. It will consider first the relation between the obligation and the 
constitutional precepts of dualism. Section (b) will then examine in particular the relation between 
the obligation of the Executive and Parliamentary sovereignty. Section (c) then turns to the larger 
frame: the question whether the recognition of such an obligation is consistent with the concept of 
the Rule of Law in its application to a particular State. 
a) Executive compliance with international law in a dualist State 
 How may the obligation upon Ministers to comply with international law be reconciled with 
the basic premise of dualism that underlies the approach of the Constitution to foreign relations? 
This premise has two elements: the separation of the international plane from the domestic and 
the separation of the power to make law binding domestically, which is reserved to Parliament, 
from the power to conduct foreign affairs––including the power to enter into treaties––which is 
exercised by the Executive under the prerogative. 
 In considering the impact of international law within the domestic polity, it is first 
necessary to distinguish between customary international law and treaties. So far as custom is 
concerned, the United Kingdom cannot be described as a dualist State. On the contrary, custom is a 
direct source of English law. Blackstone explained the reasons for this principle in a manner that 
directly confronts the dualist argument:97 
In arbitrary states [international] law, wherever it contradicts or is not provided for by the 
municipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal power: but since in England no royal 
power can introduce a new law, or suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of 
nations (wherever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here 
adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land. 
In other words, it is precisely because the Executive cannot change the law of the land by the 
arbitrary exercise of its own prerogative power that general international law must be directly 
received into English law. This is not the place to retrace the impact that this principle has had, and 
continues to have, on the substantive content of English law, which the author has done 
elsewhere.98 It suffices for present purposes to observe that, in this context, there can be no 
separation of realms.99 
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 In the case of treaty obligations, the point of departure is the same, but the consequence is 
different. In this case, the international law obligation does not arise by virtue of general 
international law. Rather it arises from the deliberate act of the Executive on the international 
plane. The principle that the Executive has no power by treaty to change the law of the land is 
fundamental to the Constitution. In 1892, Lord Herschell held that the proposition that the 
Executive was entitled to justify an invasion of an individual’s private rights at home by reference 
to a treaty obligation that it had assumed in the exercise its foreign affairs prerogative was ‘wholly 
untenable.’100 This point was central to the ratio of the Miller case on withdrawal from the European 
Union. The Supreme Court held: ‘it is a fundamental principle of the Constitution that, unless 
primary legislation permits it, the Royal prerogative does not enable Ministers to change statute 
law or the common law.’101 The Court explained: ‘the dualist system is a necessary corollary of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, or, to put the point another way, it exists to protect Parliament not 
ministers.’102 
 Nor will the courts compel domestic decision-makers to exercise their powers with 
reference to international law. As Lord Mance put it in a case concerning the exercise of a common 
law power by a lower court:103 
The United Kingdom takes a dualist approach to international law…. The starting point in this 
connection is that domestic and international law considerations are separate…. [A] 
domestic decision-maker exercising a general discretion (i) is neither bound to have regard 
to this country’s purely international obligations nor bound to give effect to them, but (ii) 
may have regard to the United Kingdom’s international obligations, if he or she decides this 
to be appropriate…. Neither by reference to the principle of legality, which refers to rights 
and obligations recognised at a domestic level, nor on any other basis is it possible to limit 
the domestic court’s general discretion by reference to unincorporated international 
obligations…. 
 But a proper account of dualism requires not only an explanation of the primary role of 
Parliament to make domestic law and the limits of the court’s powers vis-à-vis unincorporated 
treaty obligations. It also calls for an account of the legal limits on the exercise of the Executive’s 
prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. Lauterpacht addressed this question directly when 
he considered whether doctrines in domestic law that limit judicial determination in the field of 
foreign relations are a limitation on the rule of law. In his view, ‘limitations upon the freedom of 
judicial decision, far from amounting to a suspension of the rule of law, are the expression of a 
differentiation of functions, which for reasons of obvious expediency is unavoidable in the modern 
State.’104  
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 Akande and Bjorge pursue this point in the context of the debate about the Ministerial 
Code:105 
The fact that certain obligations of international law are not enforceable in the courts does 
not in any way detract from the fact that the Crown is bound by them. Much of the 
discussion of the relationship between international law and domestic law has focused on 
the extent to which international law may be applied by the courts. The unfortunate side 
effect of this concentration on judicial application of international law is that one may lose 
sight of the point that obligations may still be legal obligations binding on parties, although 
they are not enforceable before domestic courts. 
 The Constitution vouchsafes to the Executive the power of engaging the State through 
treaty actions on the international plane; ‘the making of a treaty is an executive act.’ 106 
Furthermore, by its acts or omissions, the Executive may engage the United Kingdom’s 
international responsibility vis-à-vis other states, since ‘most acts giving rise to implications of 
responsibility will emerge from the executive government, which provides the most direct 
manifestation of state power.’107 But it does not follow from this, as has been contended, that the 
legal obligation, which undoubtedly rests upon the State at international law, has no reach to 
Ministers. In order to consider this question, it is necessary to consider first the role of Ministers on 
the international plane and then, second, to consider the implications of this within the domestic 
constitution.  
 Treaties may be concluded by States108 and bind the States that are parties to them.109 The 
State is represented in treaty making by those persons who have full powers to express the 
consent of the State to be bound. The first such category, specified in Article 7(2)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is as follows: 
In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are 
considered as representing their State: 
(a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of 
performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty; 
 Once a treaty has entered into force, ‘it is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.’110 ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’ 111 If the State’s internal legislation is not in 
conformity with its treaty obligation, ‘a State which has contracted valid international obligations is 
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bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of 
the obligations undertaken.’112 
 International law, then, both (a) recognizes that Heads of Government and Foreign 
Ministers have the capacity to conclude treaty obligations that bind the State and (b) requires that 
once such a treaty enters into force the State has the obligation to perform it in good faith, 
including, where necessary, by bringing its domestic legislation into conformity with the treaty.  
 How is this responsibility at the international level given effect within the British 
Constitution? Baroness Chalker of Wallasey stated the position in answer to a written question in 
the House of Lords in 1994, which enquired whether Ministers and civil servants, in discharging 
their public functions, have a duty to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. She replied:113 
International treaties are binding on states and not on individuals. The United Kingdom is 
party to both treaties and it must comply with its obligations under them. In so far as acts of 
Ministers and civil servants in the discharge of their public functions constitute acts which 
engage the responsibility of the United Kingdom, they must comply with the terms of the 
treaties. 
 This formulation starts with the general proposition that the international obligations 
constituted by treaties bind States not individuals. This proposition can be accepted as a general 
statement. But it is important to keep in mind that there are important contexts in which 
international law does impose its obligations directly on individuals, notably (though not solely) 
under international criminal law.114 As has already been seen,115 this was a critical consideration in 
the minds of key constitutional actors in the debate of the legality of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
 The main purpose of Baroness Chalker’s statement was to describe the link between 
obligations that have been assumed by the State and the position of State ministers and officials in 
the exercise of their public functions. As she put it: ‘In so far as acts of Ministers and civil servants 
in the discharge of their public functions constitute acts which engage the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom, they must comply with the terms of the treaties.’116 In other words, since the acts 
of such officials can engage the responsibility of the State, there is a concomitant obligation upon 
such persons to comply with the obligations that the Executive has itself assumed. As Berman put 
it, the argument that international law and domestic law are in different spheres ‘fails to take into 
account that governments are comprised of individuals and act through individuals…. [T]he state is 
the hinge through which international law is transmuted into the domestic context.’117 
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 This does not turn ministers or officials into agents of international law when acting in 
relation to the international sphere, as George Scelle famously but erroneously proposed in 
developing his theory of déboublement fonctionnel.118 On the contrary, they are and remain agents 
of their State. International law imposes its obligations upon the State as a whole. It is a matter for 
the internal law of the State to determine how those obligations are to be complied with. So the 
duty of Ministers and officials to comply with the international law obligations of the State is a 
consequence of the State’s duty to give effect to its obligations in good faith, but is given effect 
through a principle of the British Constitution that allocates this responsibility internally to the 
Executive. It flows from the fact that where the Executive undertakes an international obligation on 
behalf of the State, the duty to implement it falls in the first instance on the Executive. In a dualist 
state, that responsibility may include taking steps to introduce legislation into Parliament. But that 
does not lessen the duty on the Executive, whether or not legislation is properly required. 
 It may be objected that Parliament and the judiciary are also organs of the State, who may 
engage the State’s international responsibility, yet this does not translate into a specific duty upon 
them to comply with the State’s international obligations. In the case of Parliament, there is a 
presumption that it will not legislate in breach of the international obligations of the State, the 
practical effect of which is to create a powerful incentive for Parliament in the formulation of 
legislation. But this is not such as to call into question Parliament’s law-making sovereignty within 
the domestic sphere. It may choose to legislate in breach of the international obligations assumed 
for the State on the place of international law. If it does so, it will risk placing the State in breach of 
international law, a breach for which legality under national law can provide no excuse.119 But this 
it is, as a matter of the domestic Constitution, entitled to do. 
 So too the fact that the courts may by their decisions engage the responsibility of the State 
does not entail that they are under an obligation, for that reason, to give effect to unincorporated 
treaty obligations. This is, as Lord Hoffmann put it, ‘a fallacy.’120 Lord Millett developed the point in 
this way:121 
[T]he identification of the judicial and other organs of the state with the state itself is a 
principle of international law. But it has no place in the domestic jurisprudence of the state. 
The legal relationships of the different branches of government depend on its internal 
constitutional arrangements. In the case of the United Kingdom, the governing principles are 
the separation of powers, the supremacy of Parliament, and the independence of the 
judiciary.  
 The duty of the Executive to comply with the international obligations that it has 
contracted on behalf of the State must be seen as a consequence of the role that the Constitution 
allocates to it in the field of foreign relations. Since the Constitution, as a matter of the separation 
of powers, grants the conduct of foreign affairs to the Executive, the correlative of the supremacy 
of Parliament to make law domestically is that the legal obligations that the Executive enters into 
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on behalf of the State internationally engage a duty upon the members of the Executive to comply 
with those obligations. Ministers may not be answerable in court for their breach. But that is the 
result of the limitations on the role of the domestic court in relation to international law. It does 
not suggest the absence of an obligation ab initio.  
 The existence of such an obligation flows from the fact that the power pursuant to which 
the Executive conducts foreign affairs is a legal power, not a licence for the arbitrary exercise of 
authority. ‘It is a limited source of non-statutory administrative power accorded by the common 
law to the Crown.’122 The consequence is that: ‘Without these ancient powers, Governments would 
have to take equivalent authority through primary legislation.’123 
 The nature of this power may now be compared with the powers of Parliament under the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
b) The executive foreign affairs power and Parliamentary sovereignty 
 The sovereignty of Parliament carries the consequence that, where Parliament does choose 
to legislate in the foreign affairs context and establishes a statutory scheme that is inconsistent 
with the continued exercise of the prerogative, ‘it abridges the Royal Prerogative while it is in force 
to this extent: that the Crown can only do the particular thing under and in accordance with the 
statutory provisions, and that its prerogative power to do that thing is in abeyance.’124 In that 
sense, where Parliament chooses to make specific provision proscribing the powers of Ministers in 
a particular way, Ministers are bound to comply. Where however Parliament has not asserted its 
power in such a manner, the result is not to leave the Executive with unlimited discretion in foreign 
affairs. Rather its powers are legally limited by the international law obligations that it has 
assumed on behalf of the State.  
 The British Constitution places the power to make treaties in the hands of the Executive. 
This power is now qualified by the power of Parliament to prevent, save in exceptional cases, the 
Executive from ratifying a treaty if the House of Commons has resolved that it should not be 
ratified.125 But Parliament’s power to object does not alter the legal source of the treaty-making 
power. ‘Ratification of a treaty is, as a matter of domestic law, an executive act within the 
prerogative power of the Crown.’126  
 It bears emphasising that, on many occasions, the exercise of the foreign affairs power will 
not directly collide with domestic law since it relates to the external relations of the State in its 
relations with other States and to acts outside the territory of the State. A particularly important 
aspect of this is the conduct of armed conflict. This is regulated in the field by the major 
international humanitarian law conventions that enjoy almost universal adherence. 127  Such 
conventions apply directly to the conduct of the British armed forces abroad.128 Grave breaches of 
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such conventions may, as a result of primary legislation, give rise to domestic criminal liability.129 
But the greater part of international humanitarian law simply applies directly to the exercise of the 
executive function of the armed forces by virtue of the direct operation of international law.130  
 In this field, the invocation of Parliamentary sovereignty solves nothing, since neither the 
Executive nor Parliament is competent to change international law. This is the lesson that the 
Executive learned in World War I as a result of The Zamora when it realised that ‘The Government 
cannot by executive act alter international law.’131 It also explains the insistence of the Chiefs of 
Staff on an unequivocal assurance as to the legality of the UK’s intervention in Iraq in 2003.  
 In this field, the limitation on the power of the Executive equally applies to Parliament. 
Recently published empirical research considered the views of Chiefs of the Defence Staff (‘CDS’) as 
to the status of international law vis-à-vis domestic law in the conduct of UK military operations 
reports as follows:132 
The military, without exception, saw international law as a superior source of law. One 
former CDS said that he was ‘bound by international law’ because it was the source of his 
permission to use lethal force. Another former CDS stated that international law was what 
‘define[d] the military. When asked what would happen if parliament passed a statute 
requiring the government to go to war, contrary to international law, yet another former CDS 
hesitated––the idea was clearly inconceivable to him––but then he replied: ‘I don’t think it’s 
possible for parliament to do that. Parliament could pass a Bill, but there would be very 
serious problems if it was contrary to international law.’ One former Army General was 
confused as to why parliament appeared to be unable to get to grips with international law, 
considering that he could ‘get a Private to understand it.’ 
 Nor can the legality of the actions of Ministers in peacetime be determined solely by 
reference to internal law. In Belhaj v Straw,133 Jack Straw, then British Foreign Minister, is sued, 
along with MI6 and officials, for his part in the alleged complicity of the British Government in the 
extraordinary rendition of Mr Belhaj, a prominent Libyan opponent of Gaddafi. The claim is 
formulated as a civil action in tort for false imprisonment, trespass to the person and misfeasance 
in public office. The applicable law, determined according to English domestic choice of law rules, 
is that of the place where the alleged acts took place.134 But the critical point for present purposes 
is that the Court was not precluded by the foreign act of state doctrine from scrutinising the acts of 
the Minister because they were alleged to have been carried out in concert with a foreign State. 
Such acts are ‘in breach of peremptory norms of international law’135 to which overriding effect 
must be given. 
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c) The Rule of Law and compliance with international obligations 
 It is still necessary to address a larger objection to the central proposition that the 
Executive is bound by the international legal obligations that it assumes on behalf of the State. 
That is the argument that this is inconsistent with the concept of the Rule of Law. As has been seen, 
this argument is advanced in two steps. First it is said that the Rule of Law is intrinsically 
connected with the law within the State and cannot extend to international law, which is ‘a 
defective example of law.’136 Second it is submitted that an acceptance of a legal obligation on 
Ministers to comply with international law would necessarily entail the consequence that they 
could change the legal rights and duties of ‘anyone in the realm’ contrary to the Rule of Law.137 
Each of these propositions involves a seriously fallacious reasoning step. 
 One can accept that there is a serious question about the extent to which conceptions of 
the Rule of Law that have been developed by reference to their application to national legal 
systems can be applied in the same way to the international legal system.138 But this is not the 
issue that is raised by the present debate, which concerns the application of treaty obligations 
voluntarily assumed by the State to the conduct of executive government. In this context, an 
important function of international law is precisely to contribute to government under the Rule of 
Law.  
 As Arthur Watts put it in considering the concept of the Rule of Law as applied to 
international law:139 
The rule of law is the counterweight to political power; together they establish a balance in 
which the exercise of power is subject to legal constraints which ensure that power is not 
abused. The rule of law is thus at the crossroads of law and politics: ‘[n]o legal system 
operates, or can operate, in a political vacuum; no political system can provide good 
government, ensure justice, or preserve freedom except on the basis of respect for law.’ 
 A central aspect of the Rule of Law is the control of the exercise of arbitrary power: ‘There 
is indeed a general sense in which other elements comprised within the general concept of the rule 
of law serve primarily to establish the conditions in which this central element can be realised.’140  
 In this regard, international law concerns itself not merely with the conduct of States on 
the international plane, but also with matters internal to the State. As James Crawford put it:141 
International law is concerned increasingly with matters internal to the state––human rights, 
the environment, investment protection, criminal law, intellectual property, the conditions of 
free trade in terms of the WTO, the control of civil conflict and so on. Indeed it is not too 
much to say that in many of these areas the role of international law is to reinforce, and on 
occasions to institute, the rule of law internally. 
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 The contribution of international law to the securing of the Rule of Law within the domestic 
setting was recognised in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
Danzig Decrees.142 In that case, the Court was asked by the Council of the League of Nations to give 
its opinion on the consistency with the Danzig Constitution of certain decrees instituted by the new 
National Socialist administration that amended the Penal Code that inter alia purported to confer 
upon the judge the power to deprive a person of his liberty or to convict him for the commission of 
an act which ‘according to sound popular feeling is deserving of penalty.’  
 The Court decided that it was entitled to render an Opinion since ‘though the interpretation 
of the Danzig Constitution is primarily an internal question of the Free City, it may involve the 
guarantee of the League of Nations, as interpreted by the Council and the Court.’143 That is to say, 
the conformity of measures adopted at the domestic level with the Rule of Law was a matter which 
international law could and should address. 
 At this point, the Court’s conception of the Rule of Law becomes a matter of some 
importance. It observed:144 
[T]he Constitution endows the Free City with a form of government under which all organs of 
the State are bound to keep within the confines of the law (Rechtsstaat, State governed by 
the rule of law). 
This comprises two elements. The first is requirement that the Senate must always ‘keep within the 
bounds of the Constitution and the law.’145 The second element is that the Constitution contains 
fundamental rights of the individual that ‘are designed to fix the position of the individual in the 
community, and to give him the safeguards which are considered necessary for his protection 
against the State. It is in that sense that the words “fundamental rights” have always been 
understood.’146 It is apparent from the Court’s reasoning that neither of these elements can be 
approached by reference to a purely internal understanding of legality.  
 The Court rejected the submission of the Senate of the Free City that it sufficed that the 
new provisions had legal force under the law and therefore met the requirement of the 
Constitution that allowed restrictions on the liberties of individuals to be imposed by law.147 It 
required that ‘the law itself must define the conditions in which such restrictions are to be 
imposed.’148 Here the Court takes an external view of what it is to be a ‘State governed by the rule 
of law.’ The Senate of Danzig was not entitled to determine this question for itself as a purely 
internal matter, since, by reason of treaty, the question would be judged by reference to a broader 
international conception of the Rule of Law. 
 As to the second element, the protection of such rights against the abuse of power by the 
organs of executive government acting at the domestic level is an important function of 
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international law that contributes to the maintenance of the Rule of Law. Its application is not 
limited to autocratic States, since, as Hersch Lauterpacht put it in 1949: ‘Even in democratic 
countries, situations may arise where the individual is in danger of being crushed under the impact 
of reason of State.’149 
 In this context, the control of arbitrary action by the Executive is a central concern of 
international law, as Arthur Watts rightly recognised. A Chamber of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) expressed this idea in a case in which it was called upon to decide whether the conduct 
of public officials constituted a breach of treaty. It held: 150 
Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to 
the rule of law. This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of 
‘arbitrary action’ being ‘substituted for the rule of law’ (Asylum Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, 
p. 284). It is a wilful disregard of due process of law . . . 
 There is also a fallacy in the second proposition: that to accept a binding obligation upon 
the Executive to comply with international law would necessarily entail empowering Ministers to 
change the legal rights of others within the realm. The problem with this proposition is that 
reverses the object of the legal duty and, in so doing, distorts the nature of that duty. It is certainly 
correct that Ministers may not invoke a treaty commitment to change the legal rights of individuals 
within the State. That is precisely the import of Walker and Baird151 and of Miller.152 The reason that 
Ministers may not do that is precisely to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament to legislate 
domestically to determine the rights and duties of citizens and to ensure that those rights cannot 
be taken away by executive fiat.153 
 This principle is not engaged in the present context, since the obligation to comply with 
international law rests upon Ministers themselves. Here the point is simply that, in conducting 
foreign relations, including entering into treaty relations on behalf of the State, Ministers are 
exercising a legal power––the prerogative foreign relations power––conferred upon them under 
the Constitution. In so doing they have the capacity to engage the responsibility of the State on the 
international plane: by their acts and omissions and specifically in the treaty context, by exercise 
of the power to conclude treaties as representatives of the State. That power to act on behalf of 
the State carries with it a correlative duty that itself supports the State whom they are appointed 
to serve: to abide by the international treaty obligations that the Executive has assumed. 
 It is finally objected that this gives a Minister the power to bind future Ministers. This is 
precisely the point. The executive power is exercised on behalf of the State as a whole and is 
enduring. This point was established as long ago as 1764 in the Opinion of Lord Halifax cited above: 
‘The Sovereign contracts not for himself as a private Person (for that Idea would be injurious to 
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Sovereignty) but as a public One. In other words, he binds himself, his Successors and his People, as 
the great Representative of a whole Kingdom, who neither dies nor changes in his national 
Capacity.’ 154 
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5. Conclusion  
 In conclusion, the import of the present paper has been to demonstrate that, so far from 
being an aberrant and misplaced instruction, the requirement upon Ministers to comply with ‘the 
law, including international law and treaty obligations’ is in fact an integral element in the 
operation of the British Constitution. It is supported by several centuries of consistent practice in 
which the Law Officers of the Crown take Ministerial responsibility for advice to the Government on 
its obligations under international law, for which the Government, including its Law Officers are 
answerable to Parliament. Cases in which this rule has not been followed serve only to highlight its 
continuing validity and importance. 
 The omission of the express reference to ‘international law and treaty obligations’ from the 
Ministerial Code was a retrograde step away from the clarity with which that obligation had been 
articulated in a document that is designed to provide important advice in a concise form about the 
conduct of Ministerial government. But the subsequent clarifications provided by Ministers to 
Parliament, now also memorialised in the judgments in the Gulf Centre litigation, place again 
beyond doubt that the compendious reference to ‘the law’ includes ‘international law and treaty 
obligations.’ 
 This requirement serves an important function in principle. It is not to be reduced to an 
expression of a ‘morally grounded UK policy.’155 It is itself a fundamental tenet of the British dualist 
Constitution, which, by conferring upon the Executive the prerogative power to conduct foreign 
relations, including by means of the conclusion of treaties, also imposes on the Executive the 
obligation to comply with the international law obligations, which it has assumed. This requirement 
does not undermine the Rule of Law; it advances it. Ministers may not thereby change the law of 
the land or impose obligations upon citizens that interfere with their rights under ordinary 
domestic law. Rather, the requirement ensures that the State abides by the international law 
obligations that it has assumed through the persons that contract on its behalf and represent it in 
its foreign relations.  
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